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THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE HATE SPEECH DEBATE
FREDERICK SCHAUER*

Had this event, commemorating the Bicentennial of the ratification of the First Amendment, taken place as recently as ten
years ago, it would have looked quite different. The speakers
would have been united not only in their race and gender, but in
their undeniably celebratory and unqualifiedly protective views
about the First Amendment. Perhaps a token caricatured censor
would have been included (the advantage of Senator Helms and
Donald Wildmon is that by providing such an easy target they
make it unnecessary for staunch advocates of strong First Amendment protection to confront the strongest arguments against their
position).' More likely, however, the range of the debate would
have only been about which theory (self-expression, marketplace
of ideas, town-meeting model and so on) of free speech 2 would
3
best pave the way to maximum First Amendment protection.
It should be obvious that this is not that event. Perhaps to
the joy of some of the organizers and the consternation of others,
this event is far less celebratory. This event addresses a controversy that forces us to confront considerably more vexing issues
of the costs of First Amendment protection. These issues include
the conflict between the values protected by the First Amendment
and those protected by other parts of the Constitution, a range of
often accepted but possibly erroneous presuppositions about the
* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Professorial Fellow
of the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. A.B. Dartmouth
College, 1967; M.B.A. Dartmouth College, 1968; J.D. Harvard University, 1972.
This Essay is the written version of a talk given in Philadelphia on November 20,
1991, at a Symposium on Hate Speech and the First Amendment sponsored by
the Philadelphia Bar Association and the Villanova University School of Law. I
first presented some of these thoughts at a "retreat" at the Thomas Jefferson
Center for the Protection of Freedom of Expression.
1. See, e.g., Tom Wicker, A Chilling Prospect, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1990, at A17
(discussing Mr. Wildmon's desire "to suppress expression and art that in his
wisdom he considers pornographic, blasphemous or otherwise offensive").
2. For a discussion of the various rationales underlying free speech, see
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1017-24 (2d ed. 1991).

3. On this phenomenon generally, see Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 863 (1992) (proposing that vast
majority of free speech and free press articles written in last decade advocated
theories urging greater First Amendment protection).

(805)
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effect of speech on behavior, the distinction between speech and
conduct and the ability of people to resist the harms of speech in
a way that they cannot resist harms that appear more physical. In
raising these questions, this event admirably promotes a degree
of free speech about free speech that until recently has been
largely absent from academic, journalistic and artistic discourse.
In these circles, there often seems to be far less serious debate
about the First Amendment than about which things the First
Amendment encourages us to debate.
Yet the hate speech debate is remarkable not only for putting
at issue much that liberal America has assumed a priori, but also
for the extent to which it has engaged academics (witness the
enormous number of law review articles on the subject, as well as
many articles in other disciplines) , 4 political officials (witness
4. See Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities: Are
First Amendment Values Functionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles?, 39
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing justifications for regulating hate speech on
ublic property);J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University,
9 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991) (advocating constitutionality of hate speech regulation
at universities and noting difference between its regulation on campus and in
general public); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 343 (1991) (discussing extent of racism on
campus and its attempted control); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound. A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982) (arguing that independent tort action for racial insults is both permissible
and necessary); Chester E. Finn, Jr., The Campus: "An Island of Repression in a Sea
of Freedom," COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 17 (illustrating negative impact of campus behavior codes on both minority and non-minority students); Mary Ellen
Gale, On Curbing Racial Speech, 1 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 47, 56 (1991)
("[U]niversities may prohibit and punish direct verbal assaults on specific individuals-severe or pervasive harassment based on membership in a group ...
linked to serious prejudice-if the speaker intends to do harm and if a reasonable person would recognize the potential for serious interference with the victim's educational rights."); Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment:
Racist Speech and Equal Liberty, 65 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 119 (1991) (hereinafter Gale,
Reimagining the First Amendment] (discussing relationship between First Amendment ideals and prejudiced speech on college campus and proposing regulation
of such speech which distinguishes discriminatory harassment from protected
expression); Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutionaland Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws,
39 UCLA L. REV. 333 (1991) (analyzing constitutionality and effectiveness of
criminal ethnic intimidation statutes); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are
They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1991) (examining force and
harms of racial insults and group epithets and possible approaches for regulation); Thomas C. Grey, Responding to Abusive Speech on Campus: A Model Statute,
RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990, at 50 (proposing policy which regulates expression that is assaultive and discriminatory and that plays no material part in promotion of ideas); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression
and the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95 (discussing relationship
between strong free speech protection and tolerance of hateful ideas); Charles
R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 431 (discussing debate over regulation of racial harassment on cam-
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President Bush's graduation speech at the University of Michigan
in 19915 and hate speech protective legislation sponsored by Rep.
Henry Hyde) 6 and much of the public (witness the extent to which
much of the "political correctness" debate has focused on the
hate speech issue). 7 Although free speech and free press controversies arise with some frequency, this particular question about
speech, its harms and its regulation has achieved a quite remarkable salience within a large number of domains. Why is that?
pus and injuries inflicted by racist hate speech); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and
Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1991)
(discussing civil libertarian and accomodationist approaches to hate speech and
its regulation); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) (advocating prosecution of racist
speech through formal criminal and administrative sanctions); Robert C. Post,
Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267
(1991) (proposing that hate speech regulation should be designed to redress
specific harms rather than to extinguish racism); Henry W. Saad, The Casefor
Prohibitions of Racial Epithets in the University Classroom, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1351
(1991) (advocating narrowly drawn policy prohibiting racial epithets which interfere with victims' educational rights while keeping intact free expression of
ideas); Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 933 (1991) (distinguishing university hate
speech policies that coerce manners necessary for campus civility from those
imposing a set of beliefs and values on students); Rodney A. Smolla, Academic
Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1990, at 195 (examining doctrines that protect hate speech and whether they
should have same impact on both public and private universities); Rodney A.
Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990) (discussing debate over controlling hate speech
and regulation for group racial attack on campus); Nadine Strossen, Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484 (responding to
proposals to regulate hate speech on campus); Deborah R. Schwartz, Note, A
FirstAmendment Justificationfor Regulating RacialSpeech on Campus, 40 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 733 (1989-1990) (discussing First Amendment justification for regulating hate speech at state universities and proposing model policy for regulating
racial epithets on campus).
5. See Excerpts From President's Speech to University of Michigan Graduates, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1991, § 1, at 32. During the address, President Bush stated:
"And although the [political correctness] movement arises from the laudable
desire to sweep away the debris of racism and sexism and hatred, it replaces old
prejudice with new ones. It declares certain topics off-limits, certain expression
off-limits, even certain gestures off-limits." Id.; see also Robert D. McFadden,
PoliticalCorrectness: New Bias Test?, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1991, § 1, at 32 (discussing political correctness debate).
6. See Henry J. Hyde and George M. Fishman, The Collegiate Speech Protection
Act of 1991: A Response to the New Intolerance in the Academy, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1469
(1991) (analyzing Act and explaining reasons for its proposal). In essence, The
Collegiate Speech Protection Act provides First Amendment protection for students attending private schools receiving federal financial assistance. Id. at
1493.
7. See, e.g., Anthony Flint, Speech Codes on Campus Stir Debate Over Rights, BosTON GLOBE, March 31, 1991, at 1 (discussing debate and controversy over campus speech codes designed to curb hate speech).
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What has caused this issue to come so much to the fore that it is
the natural focus for events such as this one commemorating the
Bill of Rights? I want to continue to ask questions about this issue of salience, but the questions will inevitably be sociological,
looking to cultural phenomena and not narrowly to legal doctrine
or philosophical analysis. Because answers to sociological questions are necessarily empirical, ideally involving serious scientific
testing of one form or another, the answers I will venture are only
tentative, designed to open up possibly a new area of inquiry
about this debate in particular and about free speech in general.
Thus, I will put my questions in the form of hypotheses; hypotheses I believe have some possibility of being true, but which remain
to be examined in a more systematic form.
I
The first question to be addressed is the nature of the underlying phenomena of hate speech. Legal responses to this phenomena take place against a behavioral background. Heightened
attention to legal remedies, therefore, suggests possible changes
in the underlying phenomena, or changes in the way a society reacts to the same underlying phenomena. Thus, we can ask
whether there is a new problem of hate speech, or whether instead (or in addition) there is just concentrated attention on a
problem that has been with us all along.
To address this issue, we can take up several hypotheses.
The first would account for the remarkable salience of the hate
speech issue by postulating that there is far more hate speech now
than in recent memory. Just as the signs on the Massachusetts
Turnpike prohibiting drivers from backing up if they miss their
exit tell you a great deal about Massachusetts drivers, so too do
other regulatory proposals indicate a perception that there is a
problem in need of a remedy. 8 From this perspective, the desire
of some for a greater regulatory response to hate speech is reflective of the fact that there is more hate speech. Perhaps, according
to this hypothesis, this society (and its college and university cam8. Even more startling than the signs on the Massachusetts Turnpike is the
sign I recently saw at a supermarket checkout counter, announcing that it was
necessary to purchase the product for which you submitted a coupon in order to
receive the face value on the coupon. Obviously I live a cloistered existence, for
never until seeing this sign had it occurred to me to try to redeem a coupon for a
product not purchased, any more than it had occurred to me to back up on the
Massachusetts Turnpike.
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puses) 9 was comfortable living with the implications of Brandenburg v. Ohio 10 only as long as the manifestations of its unique
9. Rather than being an issue focused on larger domains such as the feminist anti-pornography movement, the issue we address here is one that has become concentrated on college and university campuses. See, e.g., Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination,71 B.U. L. REv. 793, 804
(1992) (arguing that pornography is form of sex discrimination). A number of
explanations exist for this special attention to the academy. Because colleges
and universities are necessarily engaged in content control (as when professors,
who at state universities are technically state officials, give students higher or
lower grades based on the content of their examinations or recitations), and
because colleges and universities are in some sense closed environments, the
doctrinal arguments against hate speech regulations are weaker than against
parallel regulations in the public forum. Compare Papish v. Board of Curators of
Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (holding that "mere dissemination of
ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus may
not be shut off in name of 'conventions of decency' ") with Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (holding that public schools need not
tolerate speech that is inconsistent with educational goals and fundamental values) and Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (holding
that "[tihe determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board") and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985)
(stating that "[tihe First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its effectiveness"). Moreover, the doctrinal First Amendment question (which is not the
same as the free speech question) is especially easy for private institutions because so many colleges and universities are not state actors under the current
state action doctrine. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (finding no state action where privately operated school receives funds from state
and federal agencies). Still other factors may be at work as well. Colleges and
universities have greater concentrations than the outside world of the left-ofliberal political forces that have traditionally supported communication restrictions on progressive grounds. These institutions are also populated by the very
people likely to write articles and to see free speech restrictions as affecting them
personally. See R. H. Coase, The Marketfor Goods and the Marketfor Ideas, 64 AM.
EcoN. REV. 384, 386 (1974) (arguing that intellectuals' vested self-interest in
free speech spurns strong advocacy against its regulation). One aspect of the
First Amendment is arguably specially concentrated on the activities of academics (just as another is concentrated on the activities of journalists). See J. Peter
Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J.
251, 258 (1989) (arguing that First Amendment provides for academic freedom
in teaching, scholarship, and experimentation). Thus, academics may resist controls that would be taken as less threatening in, for example, the non-academic
workplace.
10. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). The Supreme Court in Brandenburg
reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader who denounced Jews and
blacks and suggested taking lawless action against them. Id. at 445-46. The
Court stated that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech ... do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force ... except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447; see also Collin v. Smith, 447 F.
Supp. 676, 691 (N.D. Ill.) (holding restrictions of racist speech because of its
racism constitutionally problematic under current doctrine), aff'd, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village
of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978) (hold-
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protection of racist speech were comparatively rare."1 As hate
speech becomes more common, so this hypothesis goes, it is
hardly surprising to see much more attention to the potential desirability of its regulation.
Even if this hypothesis is correct, and there is indeed more
hate speech now than there was ten or twenty years ago, questions remain about why this is so. Is it because a range of policies
and public statements by political leaders (Willie Horton stands
out, but it is hardly the only event)1 2 over the last ten years have
helped to make racial animosity (and David Duke) more socially
acceptable than in the recent past? Is it because affirmative action
programs, or descriptions of what affirmative action programs do
(whether it is what they do or not), have fueled a new resentment
on the part of many whites? Is it because First Amendment protection of hate speech since Brandenburgand Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America 13 has (even if hardly an implication
of the doctrine) helped to create a climate of acceptability that did
not exist earlier? All of these possibilities might garner some support, but whether each is any more than just a possibility is not
something that I have the ability at this point to test.
It is also possible, however, that the hypothesis that there is
more hate speech now than in the recent past is false. An alternative hypothesis posits that the extent of hate speech has not increased measurably in recent times, but rather there has been an
increase in the reporting of it by its victims. 14 A number of plausible explanations might support this hypothesis. Perhaps the
ing display of swastikas by those involved in peaceful demonstration cannot be
prohibited solely because display provokes others to unlawful violence). See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ExTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 142 (1986) (promoting use of self restraint towards
offensive or 'threatening behavior).
11. On the uniqueness of Brandenburg,when compared to the prevalence of
incitement to racial hatred laws in so many comparatively open democratic societies, see especially Matsuda, supra note 4, at 2341-48 (detailing acts and policies
regulating hate speech in international community). On those international
human rights treaties that would require their signatories to have the kinds of
laws against incitement to racial hatred that Brandenburg probably prohibits, see
Jordan J. Paust, Rereading the First Amendment in Light of Treaties ProscribingIncitement to Racial Discrimination or Hostility, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 565 (1991).
12. See The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1988)
(discussing Willie Horton controversy).
13. 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978). In Skokie, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed a lower court injunction banning the display of swastikas during a proposed Nazi demonstration. Id. at 23.
14. Accepting this hypothesis does not entail rejecting the first. Although
increased reporting might increase salience even if the extent of hate speech
remained constant, it is also possible that there has been an increase both in the
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greater presence of, for example, African Americans on college
campuses and in positions of political leadership compared to
twenty years ago, has been empowering, making it more plausible
to react to an injury by complaining and reporting rather than just
"taking it."' 5 Or perhaps the presence of affirmative action offices on college campuses has made channels of reporting and
complaint easier. In addition, it is possible that a number of parallel movements, most notably the feminist anti-pornography
movement, has made it more politically plausible to complain
about the negative consequences of various forms of communications or images.' 6
Like the first hypothesis, the hypothesis of increased reporting of hate speech incidents might be false. Even if the number of
hate speech incidents and complaints has remained constant,
however, the increased salience of this issue might be explainable
in terms of certain reported incidents getting greater attention,
quantity of hate speech and in the likelihood that any given incident will be
reported.
15. Although I think it is potentially misleading to lump all of the oppression of all oppressed groups into one empirical or analytical category, there are
parallels here with other groups. Insofar as gays and lesbians may now feel freer
to disclose their sexual orientation than in the past, they might also feel freer to
report incidents of harassment directed against them because of their sexual
orientation.
16. The foregoing sentence could be the seed for an entire article, or even
a book. With increasing frequency, the more-free-speech side of many contemporary free speech debates is being carried by those, to oversimplify, on the
political "right." See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992)
(Scalia, J.) (holding that regulations prohibiting "fighting words" may not be
content based); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (in deciding that state statute banning use of general corporate funds in state political campaigns does not violate First Amendment, "the Court today endorses the principle that too much speech is an evil
that the democratic majority can proscribe"); Board of Trustees, State Univ. of
N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (holding that government restrictions on commercial speech only require a reasonable "fit" between government's objective and restriction chosen); Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 309 (1986) (Stevens, J.) (holding agency shop act violates First Amendment by allowing non-member's contributions to be used to
subsidize unsupported ideological activities); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding that The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act's limitation
on independent candidate support violates First Amendment). This phenomenon is further apparent from public debates about cigarette advertising, campaign financing, spending and advertising, abortion center picketing, the
Dartmouth Review and numerous other issues. If this represents a trend, there are
various possible explanations for it, one of which would be that if the marketplace of ideas is a market in a literal and not just a metaphorical sense, then it
should come as no surprise that market-libertarians would also be marketplaceof-ideas-libertarians.
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both officially and in the mass media. Again, this hypothesis is
not mutually exclusive with the foregoing ones, and again the reasons for the phenomenon of increased public attention, if true,
would be complex. Unfortunately, addressing this issue would
require recourse to an expertise about factors influencing media
attention that I do not possess.' 7 It is far from impossible, however, that increased public salience is a function of less of a
change in any of the underlying phenomena than might at first
seem.

Whether these hypotheses, alone or in combination, are
plausible, it does not follow logically from any of these that the
response need be proposals for restriction. Despite an early judicial invalidation of a University of Michigan regulation of speech
modeled on EEOC workplace harassment guidelines,"' over 130
colleges and universities have now adopted somewhat narrower
regulations.' 9 The subsequent regulations are tailored more specifically to address only those utterances that resemble the communications encompassed by the Supreme Court's "fighting
words" doctrine. 20 Although one issue is the reason why colleges
17. One thing I do possess, however, is the understanding that press interest in First Amendment issues is at least partially influenced by the fact that the
press is an interested party and not just an observer of issues touching on the
First Amendment. This plainly affects the coverage of issues relating to press
protection under the First Amendment, but it is less clear that it affects coverage
of other First Amendment issues.
18. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(holding anti-discrimination and harassment policy unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad). Although I was Professor of Law at the University of Michigan at
the time the regulation was put into effect and its notorious examples were distributed, I was not involved in the process and indeed was unaware of the content of any of the proposed regulations. Only as to me, however, it is possible
that my unqualified unwillingness to enter into lawyer/client or similar consulting relationships, and my related view that a law faculty should not be seen as
the university's lawyer, would partly explain why no one asked me what I
thought.
19. The Hard Facts, LINGUA FRANCA, Oct. 1991, at 5 (reporting that 137 universities have implemented restrictions on public speech since 1988).
20. For an explanation and defense of this variety of narrow regulation, see
Grey, supra note 4, at 50 (proposal regulating discriminatory harassment based
significantly on "fighting words" doctrine). The term "fighting words" refers to
those words, unprotected by the First Amendment, which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Although these hyper-narrow
regulations are referred to in "fighting words" terms, it is important to note that
they are premised on the "verbal assault" idea, and not just on the "provocation
to violence" aspect of both Chaplinsky and other cases. See Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) ("It shall be... a breach of the peace for any

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/5

8

Schauer: The Sociology of the Hate Speech Debate

1992]

SOCIOLOGY OF THE HATE SPEECH DEBATE

813

and universities with regulatory inclinations in this area have
tended to adopt such narrow approaches, 2 1 another is why so
many have decided to do anything at all. What, therefore, might
explain the link between identification of and attention to the
problem of hate speech and widespread proposals for its
regulation?
One possibility starts with the premise that much of existing
free speech discourse is based on the theoretically and doctrinally
erroneous presupposition that speech is protected because it is
harmless, or, more plausibly, that the harms caused by speech are
systematically different in kind, smaller in magnitude and less fre22
quent in occurrence than those caused by non-speech conduct.
To the extent that arguments for freedom of speech are premised
on the harmlessness of speech, or even on the comparative harmperson.., to curse or ...use obscene.., language toward [a police officer].");
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972) (Georgia statute prohibited use of
"opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the
peace"). See generally Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.
L.Q 531, 536-64 (1980) (analyzing current status of "fighting words" doctrine
and its material elements).
21. Here I mean to suggest a range of questions about the desire to avoid
litigation, the desire to avoid negative publicity of a certain type and from certain quarters, and the effect of organizations such as the American Civil Liberties
Union in influencing university as well as public policy. Given that the decision
in Doe was a single decision by a single United States district judge; given that it
was not appealed; given that there is virtually no Supreme Court case law addressing the question of the permissible scope of restrictions on classroom or
even campus speech at the college and university level; given that the Doe decision itself is highly controversial; and given that the University of Michigan interpretive materials were so egregious as to make any other case distinguishable,
post-Doe narrowness cannot be explained solely by a desire to comply with "the
law." Rather, it can only be explained by the panoply of factors that explain why
at a given level of legal "risk" certain decisionmakers make certain decisions and
others do not.
22. This is a consistent theme of the self-expression or self-realization

strand of free speech theory. See, e.g., C.

EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND

47-69 (1989) (arguing that protected speech supports selfrealization and self-fulfillment in non-violent, non-coercive manner); MARTIN H.
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19 (1984) (proposing
that speech causes less direct or immediate harm than physical conduct); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); C. Edwin Baker, The
Process of Change and The Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S.CAL. L. REV.
293, 332 (1981) (arguing that harmful effects of speech result "from the second
party's voluntary assimilation, interpretation, and reaction to the message of the
speaker, responses which the second party chooses and for which we normally
hold the second party responsible"); Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678,
684 (1982) (arguing that harms from speech are substantially less direct and
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

severe than harms from physical conduct); see also JUDITH JARVIS

THOMSON, THE
REALM OF RIGHTS 227-48 (1990) (arguing that non-physical intrusions are differ-

ent in kind and smaller in degree than physical intrusions).
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lessness of speech, then the natural corollary is that when speech
is harmful it falls outside of the rationale for free speech protection and may be regulated.
I do not believe that we protect speech because it is harmless,
or even because its harms, individually or in the aggregate, are
smaller than the harms caused by non-speech conduct. 23 Rather,
existing free speech principles are based on protecting speech despite the harm it may cause. My aim here is not to explain why
this is so. Rather, it is merely to point out that insofar as widely
believed free speech rationales (whether sound or not) do in fact
focus on harmlessness (and note here the frequency with which
the harmlessness claim is cloaked in "speech is the symptom and
not the cause" language), then those who rely on such rationales
are open to the claim that because this speech is harmful then it
may be regulated consistent with an existing understanding of the
First Amendment.
Thus, when those who are injured by hate speech call attention to that injury, and challenge those who deny the injury (usually by using the term "offense," the word most commonly
employed by those who want to trivialize what someone else
claims is a harm),2 4 the step from the injury to regulation is one
that paradoxically has been created by much of the free speech
culture itself. This may not be surprising. If we assume that
speech has roughly the same capacity to injure as other forms of
conduct, then it is no easy task to justify special protection for
freedom of speech (which is not to say that it is impossible). The
task is made much easier if it can be claimed that speech, or certain categories of speech, are less harmful, and that it is this comparative harmlessness that justifies special protection. The
problem is that if harmlessness (or lesser harm) is the justification, it is open to those who identify and claim real harm (or
greater harm) to observe that regulation is the logical entailment
23. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
(1982) (stating that identification of harm does not "provide a sufficient reason
for regulation" of speech); Frederick Schauer, Must Speech be Special?, 78 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1284, 1298 (1984) (theorizing that mere inclusion of free speech in Constitution justifies its protection).
24. Slightly less common but even more troubling is using references to
"bad taste." If you tell me in public that my fly is open, or if you wear plaid golf
pants when teaching (or when playing golf, for that matter), you have engaged in
an act that is in bad taste. But if you call me a "hebe," you have engaged in
conduct of a morally different order causing a harm also of a totally different
order. All too often, however, those who use in the latter type of case language
most apt for the former are those who are unwilling to admit the harm in the
latter.
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of the argument that it is the very lack of real harm that undergirds the special protection of the First Amendment.
III
As a result, part of what is taking place in the contemporary
hate speech debate may be a simple reaffirmation of a widespread
American belief ("sticks and stones may break my bones, but
names will never hurt me") that free speech protection is based
on, and consequently limited to, the harmlessness (or lesser
harm) of speech. Harmful speech, therefore, is simply outside the
ambit of the protection of free speech. In this regard, the call for
regulation on the part of those injured is one way of drawing attention to the harm they feel or have observed. Such actual harm
is one way of challenging the claim that hate speech is harmless,
or is merely a matter of offense and not "real" harm; a claim usually (although not always) 25 made by those who have rarely been
26
and are unlikely to be its victims.
Although the harmful/harmless line may not explain very
much of free speech theory or free speech doctrine, 2 7 it may ex25. See Charles Lawrence & Gerald Gunther, Good Speech, Bad Speech: Should
Universities Restrict Expression That Is Racist or Otherwise Denigrating?, STAN. LAWYER,
Spring 1990, at 4, 7 (arguing that harmful effects of hate speech are no justification for denying First Amendment protection). Gunther's status as Holocaust
escapee gives his claims a vantage point of understanding not likely shared by
many who are quick to underassess the harms alleged by the victims of hate
speech. This is not to say that Gunther is necessarily right in the arguments he
sees as emanating in part from his experiences, but if we are to take claims of
victims seriously (as we should), his claims are entitled to be taken more seriously than those who, never having felt the effect of true hate speech, are quick
to suggest that its victims are being overly sensitive.
26. For a discussion of this position, see Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment, supra note 4, at 138 ("Heterosexual white males ... identified as both the
normal and the model person, often exalt the heroic ideal of the first amendment while seldom, if ever, suffering its consequences."). The claim that strong
free speech arguments are disproportionately likely to be made by those who are
disproportionately unlikely to be injured by speech mirrors the claim that free
speech arguments are also disproportionately likely to be made by those who
disproportionately value speech-dependent intellectual and artistic activities.
For a further discussion on this phenomenon, see Coase, supra note 9, at 386
(arguing that an intellectual's vested self-interest in free speech provides strong
incentive for its protection). See also Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic
Market Place, 7J.L. & ECON. 1, 6 (1964) (theorizing that "the preference for free
speech among intellectuals runs in terms of [their] vertical interests").
27. Cases protecting speech despite its harms are legion, but among the
most vivid are Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 300-01 (1971)
(holding publisher's false reporting of criminal charges against public figure
without mention of his political status protected by First Amendment); Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding nationally
circulated magazine's article describing practice of autoerotic asphyxiation, al-
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plain a great deal of an American attitude towards regulation in
general. We live to some extent in a Millian world, such that
harm is taken to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for
government regulation.2 8 As a consequence, the prevailing political and social climate appears to be such that the most common
response to a harm is to seek to have it or the activities causing it
prohibited by law. Indeed, it often seems that failure to press for
regulation is taken as an acknowledgement that the harm complained of is trivial, or at least not as weighty as other harms.
Thus, when those who are harmed by communicative acts understandably desire the harms to be recognized by those in authority
(including college and university administrators), these victims
ask the authorities to acknowledge their harm suffered in the
"good old-fashioned American way," by proposing a regulation.
If college and university administrators who refuse to take such
actions are accused of failing to appreciate the seriousness of the
harm, an enormous amount of American political culture, even if
not the narrow and arcane confines of free speech theory and free
speech doctrine, support that inference.
IV
Even the broadest of the proposed hate speech regulations,
however, is spectacularly underinclusive of the range of speechproduced harms. Just as with, for example, the Indianapolis antipornography ordinance,2 9 the harms caused by communicative
activities are far broader than even the broadest reach of the
broadest proposed regulation. In contemplating the question of
hate speech generally, or racist hate speech more specifically, we
discover that the utterances of David Duke, the Willie Horton ads,
the racially stereotyping discourse of sportscasters, 30 the almost
total absence of non-white faces from advertising and engagelegedly prompting death of adolescent, protected by First Amendment), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr.
888, 892-93 (Cal. 1981) (holding television broadcast depicting artificial rape of
adolescent, allegedly prompting such rape on minor, failed to fulfill incitement
requirements of Brandenburg and, therefore, was constitutionally protected), cert.

denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
28. See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in

ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS

(Stefan Collini ed., 1989). The essence of Mill's argument is that the regulation
of individual actions can only be justified when it is designed to prevent harm to
others. Id. at 13.
29. On the largely First Amendment-induced underinclusiveness of current
anti-pornography proposals, see generally Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory
and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 737.
30. Pursuant to this discourse, black athletes are deemed to have "natural"
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ment/bridal announcements in so-called mainstream newspapers
and so on are constitutionally protected. Similarly, in the context
of colleges and universities, the overt racial hostility of the
Dartmouth Review, 3 1 the racially-based resentments of students
who assume that all of their Latino and African American classmates are in some way unqualified, the behavior of faculty members whose classroom insensitivity is astonishing and so on is all
likely outside the reach of politically plausible or constitutionally
permissible regulation.
Given the pervasiveness of racially marginalizing communication in society at large and also on college and university campuses, and given a historical willingness to accept it, how are its
victims to call attention to the phenomenon? One way, often effective, is to call for regulation of only a small and more plausibly
regulable subset of a much larger problem. In this sense, as Professor Lawrence and others properly point out,3 2 the regulation is
symbolic. Though such a regulation may be troublesome, it is no
more troublesome than supporting the First Amendment on symbolic grounds, 3 or the presence throughout our regulatory structure of underinclusive coercive regulation designed to call
attention to a much larger problem that cannot, constitutionally
or pragmatically, be dealt with in the same regulative or coercive
fashion.
Again, the model may be the Indianapolis anti-pornography
ordinance, a particularly strong example because of its judicial invalidation. 34 I say that this is a particularly strong example of
talent while white athletes reach commensurate positions by intelligence and
hard work.
31. See, e.g., Dartmouth Review, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 15, 1990, at
22. The article listed various quotes from the Dartmouth Review. One such quote
from 1982 was apparent commentary on affirmative action programs at
Dartmouth:
Some of us be gettin' into Ivy schools from the inner city, even 'do we
not be bustin' our gizzards doin' work. But where the Ivy be at? Now
we be comin' to Dartmout and be up over our 'fros in area studies, but
we still not be graduatin' Phi Beta Kappa. Maybe dere should be annuda 'firmative-action program 'bout dat.
Id. (quoting Dartmouth Review).
32. For a discussion of Lawrence's position, see Lawrence, supra note 4, at
481 (theorizing that "the regulation of certain face-to-face racial vilification may
be justified under current [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine as an analogy to the
protection of certain classes of captive audiences on university campuses").
33. For a discussion of this symbolic support, see BOLLINGER, supra note 10,
at 7 (stating that free speech is one of America's core cultural symbols and is
"suffused with symbolic significance").
34. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324-25 (7th Cir.
1985) (holding anti-pornography ordinance defining pornography as "the
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symbolic underinclusiveness because the invalidation made the
regulation as underinclusive as possible. Despite that invalidation, it would take a remarkably narrow, law-focused view of social change to deny the cultural effectiveness of the feminist antipornography movement. At least in the circles in which most of
us at this event travel, it would no longer be plausible to defend
the worth of (or have on our coffee table) Hustler magazine. Daytime television is no longer as likely to treat rape as the appropriate way of initiating a long-term relationship (as with Luke and
Laura on General Hospital). Art that glorifies sexual violence or the
objectification of women is now condemned on those grounds
even by those who would strongly resist any attempt to censor
it.35

Obviously, there remain difficult questions of cause and effect. It does not seem totally implausible, however, to maintain,
first, that feminist claims about harms to women in and from endorsing images and descriptions of sexual violence and the degradation of women have had an effect on how much of this society
views a wide range of undeniably and properly constitutionally
protected communication. Second, this effect was promoted by a
strategy of advocating regulation in a way that might have been
36
less had other strategies been employed.
If I am right about the hypothesis that a political movement
organized around a regulatory proposal has increased public
awareness of the harmful potential of a range of constitutionally
protected communications, and if I am right in the hypothesis
that this effect might have been less had a regulatory proposal not
graphic sexually explicit subordination of women" unconstitutional for regulating speech content), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
35. Susan Gubar, Representing Pornography: Feminism, Criticism, and Depictions
of Female Violation, 13 CRITICAL INQUIRY 712, 714 (1987) (discussing dehumanizing aspects of pornography).
36. There is a serious counter-argument here based on the fact that underinclusive regulation may have a quite different symbolic effect by validating or
legitimating that which is not regulated. On this possibility vis-a-vis anti-discrimination regulation, see Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law. A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049 (1978). Freeman argues that American anti-discrimination law is
approached from the perspective of the perpetrator, focusing on the specific
unlawful actions of the perpetrator rather than on the broad social conditions
caused by discrimination. Id.at 1053. He further states that this perspective
places discriminatory conduct not covered under legislation "beyond the law."
Id. at 1056. I would not reject this counter-argument out of hand, and can only
suggest that the question of which symbolic effect will dominate is likely to be
both domain-specific, and, in theory, empirically measurable.
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been the organizing force of the movement,3 7 then it may be that
the real gains from proposals for regulation of hate speech are
only loosely tied to the reach of such regulations, and perhaps
even only loosely tied to whether the regulations are actually
adopted. With several years of salience of the hate speech debate,
is there more or less hate speech than there was three years ago?
Has the debate made people more or less reluctant to utter the
kinds of harmful words that are at the center of the debate? I
cannot establish the truth of the hypothesis that the debate itself,
prompted by a regulatory focus of some of its protagonists, has
reduced the amount of hate speech that exists compared to what
the level would have been had the debate not taken place.
It may not say anything very good about the United States
that the best way to attract public attention to a problem is by
proposing regulation, but that may be a fact of contemporary
political life. If so, then the true objects of these regulations are
the legions of students and faculty who, as a result of this whole
controversy, are now more sensitive to the possibility that what
they say may seriously impair the educational opportunities of
others. Maybe, as proponents of the "anti-political-correctness"
movement would have it, some of this reluctance to speak has
been unfortunate. 38 But not every socially-induced refusal to
speak, even on a university campus, is a bad thing, and although it
is unfortunate when things that should be said are not, it is also
unfortunate when things that should not be said are said. Close
attention to the politics and sociology of the hate speech controversy may ultimately tell us far more than will a too-narrow focus
on only the constitutional aspects of the proposed regulations.
37. Of course it would be difficult to establish this with much confidence
because the existing information is unlikely to allow a test against a control
where a movement with the same goals made no regulatory proposals. But even
if the regulatory focus (as opposed, say, to a movement focused exclusively on
boycotts, or public condemnation or other forms of anti-pornography education) of the feminist anti-pornography movement has not been causally related
in a positive way to whatever success that movement has had socially, it still
might be perceived as such. The end result being that those who would seek to
emulate that movement's successes in other areas (such as by raising awareness
of the harms caused by marginalizing classroom utterances by students and
faculty) might consequently emulate the regulatory focus, however statistically
spurious that focus might have been.
38. For a politically insightful look at this debate, from a perspective more
sociological than legal, see Mark Tushnet, Political Correctness, the Law, and the
LegalAcademy, 4 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 127, 131-44 (1992) (arguing that conservative characterization of political correctness, particularly in DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1990) is

greatly distorted).
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